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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AMENDMENT ON
TIME LIMITATIONS: STATUTORY AUTHORITY
FOR REGULATIONS AT ISSUE
A RECENT amendment to a Civil Aeronautics Board regulation' and the
latest developments in case law have curbed attempts by air carriers to
limit liability for death and injury claims through tariff provisions. Pre-
viously, provisions concerning time limitations for giving notice of death
or injury claims and for initiating action thereon had been included within
the tariffs filed by the airlines with the CAB. 2 Since the passenger was
notified on his ticket that it was "sold subject to tariff regulations," the
airlines claimed relief from liability when the time limitation provisions
were not complied with by the injured party or his representatives. 3
Although the Civil Aeronautics Act of 19384 does not expressly require
the filing of time limitation provisions within an airline's tariff, the CAB
had accepted the air carriers' time limitations as part of the filed tariff.
However, the Board's recent amendment to its Economic Regulations states
that tariff rules limiting or conditioning the carrier's liability for personal
injury or death will not be accepted.5 In effect this Amendment indicates
that those parts of tariff provisions relating to personal injury and death
claims formerly filed with the CAB will no longer receive the indirect sanc-
tion6 of the Board.
Since no express provision concerning time limitations appears in the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, it is questionable whether the Board ever had
statutory authority to accept them as a part of the air carrier's tariff. The
Board feels that it has Congressional authority to regulate time limitation
provisions, relying upon Section 403(a) of the ;Civil Aeronautics Act,7 which
requires that "(e)very air carrier . . .shall file with the Board, and print,
and keep open to public inspection, tariffs showing ...to the extent re-
quired by regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules, regulations,
1 14 Code Fed. Regs. §221.4(g) (Rev. Ed. 1952). The regulation had stated
that tariffs would contain "(g) eneral rules which govern the tariff, i.e. state con-
ditions in the tariff, or the service under such rates."
2 An example of this particular rule filed with the CAB reads as follows:
C.A.B. no. 27, Tariff Rule, General Rules, Paragraph 17, Claims, (A) Personal
Injury-Time limitations
"No action shall be maintained for any injury to or the death of any passen-
ger unless notice of the claim is presented in writing to the general office of
the participating carrier alleged to be responsible within ninety days after
the alleged occurrence of the events giving rise to the claim and unless the
action is commenced within one year after the alleged occurrence."3 Cf: Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines, 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949).
452 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. §401 et. seq. (1952).
5 Civil Aeronautics Board Economic Regulation 221.4(g) 19 Federal Register
509 (1954). The amendment states:
"No provision of the Board's Regulation issued under this part or elsewhere
shall be construed to require on and after March 2, 1954, the filing of any
tariff rules stating any limitation on, or condition relating to, the carrier's
liability for personal injury or death. No subsequent regulation issued by
the Board shall be construed to supersede or modify the rules of construction
except to the extent that such regulation shall do so in express terms."6 Although the Civil Aeronautics Act never expressly provided for time limi-
tations, airlines had filed these provisions with the Board as a part of their tariff
regulations. Since airlines were required by statute to file their tariffs with the
Board, and the Board accepted time limitations as a tariff provision, it can be
assumed that the CAB gave their implied approval to time limitations.
7 52 Stat. 992, 49 U.S.C. §483(a) (1952).
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practices, and services in connection with such air transportation.. . ." This
section further provides that the tariff "shall contain such information,
as the Board shall by regulation prescribe .... " Therefore, if the provisions
for time limitations can be considered a tariff, matter involving classifica-
tions, rules, regulations, practices, or services of the airline, the Board
would have authority to regulate the airline's time limitations.8
Courts have upheld the validity of time limitations on a contract basis.9
These cases, however, do not discuss the statutory question and, therefore,
cannot be relied upon as authority that the CAB has regulatory power.
Recovery was contingent solely on whether the passenger had made a bind-
ing agreement with the airline when -he purchased a ticket which, for
example, stipulated that it was "sold subject to tariff regulations."' 10
Since early 1952, case law has invalidated time limitations for death
and injury claims on the basis of a lack of statutory authority. Shortley v.
Northwest Airlines," foremost in this line of cases, held that there was no
statutory authority for these provisions since nothing in the Civil Aero-
nautics Act authorizes or requires time limitations to be included in a tariff.
The Shortley decision found precedent in a case12 involving a compara-
ble situation under the Shipping Act.13 At the time, the Shipping Act
required all water carriers to file tariffs with the Shipping Board without
any express provision permitting a time limitation to be included in the
carrier's tariff. A carrier filed a time limitation as part of its tariff. When
an injured passenger did not comply with the time limitation, the water
carrier maintained that it was relieved of liability. The court found no
statutory authority for the inclusion of time limitations and added that they
could not be considered part of the tariff since a tariff relates only to rates
and charges.
14
8 Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, 81 S.E. 2d 178, 183 (N.C. 1954).
9 See Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 258 U.S. 22 (1922) (an agreement
for consideration as to claim and commencement of action held to be binding) ;
Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines, 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949) (flight
ticket "sold subject to tariff regulations" was held a binding agreement between
passenger and airline); Herman v. Capitol Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. N.Y.
1951) (a time limitation provision became part of contract between parties;
statutory question not raised); Jones v. Northwest Airlines, 22 Wash. 2d 863,
157 P. 2d 728 (1945) (airline relieved from liability for flight cancellations;
statutory authority for the particular tariff rule not discussed) ; Sheldon v. Pan
American Airways, 272 App. Div. 1000, 74 N.Y.S. 2d 578 (1947) (time limitation
for presenting claims expressly stated in ticket held contractually binding). See
note 27, infra.
10 Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines, supra note 9.
11104 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D.D.C. 1952): "Nowhere, however, in the Act of
Congress, or in the regulations promulgated by the Board, is there any authori-
zation or requirement for the inclusion in a tariff of any provision respecting
limitations upon notice of claims or upon the time for commencement of action
thereon .... Where a tariff provision is gratuitously inserted with respect to a
matter other than that contemplated or required by the Act of Congress or the
regulations made pursuant thereto, a passenger or shipper is not chargeable with
notice as a matter of law with respect thereto."
12 Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cachette, 8 F. 2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925).
13 39 Stat. 735 (1916), 46 U.S.C. §817 (1952).
14 Soon after the Shortley case was decided, two other courts invalidated
time limitation provisions on statutory grounds. In Thomas v. American Air-
lines, 104 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Ark. 1952), the court said that "[the] Civil Aero-
nautics -Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C.A. §401 et. seq. sets forth the provisions relating
to the filing of tariffs and does not require or authorize by implication the filing
of tariffs limiting in any way the liability of the carrier for its own negligence
for personal injury to its passengers."
The court felt in Toman v. Mid-Continent Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.
Mo. 1952) that since Congress has expressly provided for Water carrier time
limitations, it follows that express authorization is necessary in the airline field.
The court added that the rule of the Wilhelmy case had not been followed and in
fact a contrary ruling had been developed in the Shortley case.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The viewpoint of the Shortley case has been followed by two recent de-
cisions. Bernard v. U.S. Aircoach held that the CAB lacked statutory
authority to accept time limitations as a tariff provision. 15 The court inter-
preted a "tariff" to be a schedule of rules "for service to be rendered by the
airplane and not one for compensation for the torts committed by it." As
illustrated by the Bernard case, Congress has granted the CAB regulatory
power over tariff provisions only. 16 A "tariff" has generally been interpreted
to be a system of rates and charges.
17
Time limitations have not been considered to be provisions relating to
rates or charges. Consequently, statutory authority would not exist for the
acceptance of time limitations as a valid tariff provision.1 8
On the other hand, the CAB claims statutory authority for time limi-
tation provisions within an airline tariff. The contention is that time
limitations were "clearly carrier rules, regulations, and practices in con-
nection with air transportation and, as such could be required by the Board
to be filed under section 403(a)" of the Civil Aeronautics Act.19 The Board
feels that in not accepting time limitations it is exercising the power Con-
gress gave it over these provisions.
In a second case, however, the highest court of North Carolina held that
the ,Civil Aeronautics Act neither requires nor authorizes the filing of time
limitations pertaining to notice of claims and commencement of suit.20 The
court concluded that since Congress has not sought to occupy the field of
air carrier's liability the state statute of limitations is applicable.
It must be noted that in comparable statutes regulating other common
carriers, Congress has expressly provided for time limitations. A Shipping
Act amendment 2' and the Interstate Commerce Act 22 expressly provide for
time limitations for filing claims and bringing suit. Since no such provision
appears in the Civil Aeronautics Act it was argued that Congress has not
intended to occupy this field.
In addition to the statutory question, time limitations have also been
attacked on other grounds. It was contended that Congress in passing the
Civil Aeronautics Act had provided for uniformity in all rates, practices,
and services through the supervision of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 23 Con-
sequently, state statutes of limitations which grant longer periods for giving
notice of claim and commencing action thereon would not be controlling on
litigants and would have to give way to time limitation provisions filed with
the Board. Nevertheless the CAB stated in its recent amendment that it
was not requiring such filing because the public has demonstrated an ap-
proval of a local jurisdiction governing the claim. 24
As a practical matter, the carriers felt that tariff provisions for time
limitations would prevent fraudulent claims from being brought subsequent
to the period in which a satisfactory investigation could be undertaken.25
It was believed that reference to the tariff provisions could be best achieved
by a statement on the ticket that it was "sold subject to tariff regulations"
15 117 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
16 Id. at 138.
11 Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cachette, 8 F. 2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1925).
18 Ibid.
10 19 Fed. Reg. 509 (1954).
20 Cromwell v. Eastern Airlines, 81 S.E. 2d 178 (N.C. 1954).
21 49 Stat. 960 (1935), 46 U.S.C. §183(b) (1952). The Shipping Act pro-
hibits time limitations of less than six months for death and injury claims and
of less than one year for institution of suits thereon.
2246 Stat. 252 (1930), 49 U.S.C. §20(11) (1952). The Interstate Commerce
Act prohibits time limitations of less than nine months for property damage
claims and of less than two years for the institution of suits thereon.
23 Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, 189 F. 2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1951).
2419 Fed. Reg. 509 (1954).
25 Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162, 165, 139 N.E. 226, 228 (1923).
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since the tariff provisions were too intricate, complex, and lengthy for the
general public to read and understand. 28 Notwithstanding this position,
mere reference to such provisions could conceivably be used as a method for
relieving a carrier from liability.27 On the other hand, it is questioned
whether the great majority of passengers ever have actual notice of the
tariff provisions.
28
Since current case law and the recent amendment of the CAB both
adversely affect the airline's attempt to limit its liability, the validity of
time limitations may at first glance appear to have been settled. Yet the
conflict between case law and the CAB statutory authority for regulation
of time limitations may lead to future inconsistent court decisions.
For example, the recent amendment relates only to the "carrier's liabil-
ity for personal injury or death." It does not regulate the carrier's liability
for property damage or loss. Therefore, if a court followed the CAB's con-
tention that statutory authority exists for regulating time limitation pro-
visions, it would probably validate a provision regarding property damage
or loss, However, a court that follows the Shortley case would deny the
CAB authority over time limitations on claims for property damage or loss.
Further, the possibility remains that the CAB may reverse its present
position and require time limitations to be filed as a provision of the air-
line's tariff since the Board claims statutory authority. Thus, if a court
should adopt this position, the Board's present viewpoint may in the future
benefit the air carriers. But a court following the Shortley decision would
reject any Board regulation regarding this matter unless Congress ex-
pressly authorized such regulatory power over time limitations.
If the CAB's position is to be accepted by case law, a judicial departure
from the present decisions is necessary. It is not likely that this circum-
stance will occur. Therefore, even though the CAB and case law do not
agree on the statutory question, future court decisions can be predicted
with a fair degree of certainty.
26 Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines, 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949)
Koontz v. South Suburban Safeway Lines, 332 Ill. App. 14, 16, 73 N.E. 2d 919,
920 (1947).
27 Shortley v. Northwest Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 152 (D.D.C. 1952) pointed
out that a contract may be made imposing a reasonable time limit for making
claims and filing suits if the contract terms are distinctly declared and deliber-
ately accepted by the passenger; however, referring passengers to unauthorized
provisions included in a filed tariff will not accomplish the condition needed for
imposition of time limitation by contract.
28 19 Fed. Reg. 509 (1954).
